In my last post I posited U.S.-Russian relations as a sub-category of a larger ideological conflict that the U.S. is fully engaged in. Russia as a means, but definitely not the end.
For Ukraine, the story is of course quite different. Russia may not be the Alpha (after all it's in Kyiv where can most definitely trace the origins of the Slavic peoples) but it's certainly the form and content, and could very well be its Omega.
With the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukraine was fastening its blinders looking West. In the aftermath of the Orange party's complete failure to provide the treasures they promised, and the subsequent dissolution of that fragile political unity, belief and pursuit of Western-modeled democracy (and culture) has waned substantially. As a host of Ukrainian political figures tug at the fabric of a nation that becomes poorer and poorer as the economic crisis continues to ravage, the power-vacuum has opened wider than ever. Government ineptitude, political disunity, and bureaucratic squabble are taken as a granted in contemporary Ukraine. As the hryvnia falls against the dollar, people lose jobs, roads are left unpaved, and week after week the Eurocup 2012 bid looks to be in jeopardy, Ukrainians lack faith in political leadership to save their country. It's only natural then, why the antithesis of this power void, the obvious and celebrated complete consolidation of power in Russia, has grown increasingly alluring to many Ukrainians. Next door, in Russia they have a sterling historical precedent of how one man's power and bulldozing of opposition can dig a Slavic country out of recession and back to resurgence.
During my time in Ukraine many people have met my expectation of Russian perception by voicing their distaste for the brand of totalitarianism that seems to many to be emanating from the Kremlin. They see what happened in Georgia as a kind of ominous indication of the kind of Russia they might face in the future in Crimea, home to the Russian fleet and distinctly pro-Russian (even anti-Ukrainian) nationalism. And when Russia decided to turn off Ukraine's natural gas supply, albeit Ukraine was/is failing in payment, they saw this as a sort of reminder by Russia what little power Ukraine has if it decides to find new dancing partners.
However, connected by their Slavic blood, their language, and centuries of intimate history (regardless of its atrocities), Ukraine and Russia are sisters, and right now lil' sis' is seriously reconsidering her Western flirtations and looking up to big sis' again because she gets her shit done. Regardless of the fact that Russia's taking it as hard as everyone else right now, the West can't hope to provide the power of example so strongly as (Mother) Russia.
2 comments:
Agree with you, Mike, in the point that Ukraine and Russia are strongly tied together by the very fact of their 'common' history. Still, the level of the 'commonless' of this history is under a big question as once Ukraine had much closer connection with the other contries e.g. Poland, Turkey or Sweden. There is only one - but a dramatic - difference. Those states had never done such a big damage to the Ukrainian national consciousness as Russia have been doing for the centuries.
Once, before the destruction of the Zaporizka Sich cossack settlement, the Russian empress Catherine the Great said this: 'We have to erase every mentions about the Hetmans (the cossack leaders) so that they never recollect them here.' It almost heppened on that part of the country controlled by the Russian Empire.
Why I'm saying this? Ukraine shouldn't ask for EU membership. It is one of the oldest European states which lacks the scanty attention from its 'prosperous' and 'wealthy' European brothers who used to shut their eyes to the birth of the new dangerous Russias' appetites.
Thanks for the perspective, Misha. I never considered that Ukraine might have had a history more closely shared with Europe than with Russia. I figured that Ukraine's European elements were fostered in conjunction with Russia's quest to become more European in the 18th and 19th centuries.
While it's interesting to think that while Ukraine shouldn't have to win European support to be accepted in that community, it WILL have to as long as Russia is standing in opposition to this. Between the U.S., Europe, and Russia it seems like, that while of them have a clear stance on the fate of former Soviet states in Eastern Europe, none of the parties want to (or are able to) really make a on move on it.
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